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PROFESSIONAL DEGREE-TRADITIONAL ALIMONY CAN BE RESTRUCTURED
TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT TO A SPOUSE WHO SUPPORTS HIS OR HER

DEGREE-Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
PARTNER IN THE QUEST FOR AN ADVANCED

One of the most intensely debated issues in matrimonial law today is whether a professional degree or license is property subject to
equitable distribution upon divorce. I The Supreme Court of New Jersey
recently decided this volatile issue in Mahoney v. Mahoney,2 holding

See Skoloff, ProfessionalDegree as Property: Can You Take It All With You?, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 3, 1983, at 18.
2 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). Two companion cases to Mahoney, Lynn v. Lynn, 91
N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) and Hill v. Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537 (1982), were decided
on the same day. In Lynn, the court held that a medical degree and license were not property
subject to equitable distribution. Lynn, 91 N.J. at 517, 453 A.2d. at 452. The court noted that
while the facts in Lynn were more complicated than those in Mahoney, the legal issues were
the same. Id. at 512, 453 A.2d at 540.
Robert and Bonnie Lynn were married in 1971. While Robert attended medical school, Bonnie
provided for most of the household expenses with the expectation that her husband's education
would bring future benefits to the couple. Id. at 512-13, 453 A.2d at 540. Bonnie Lynn worked
full time to support the household during the first three years of their marriage. Id. at 513, 453
A.2d at 540. Her husband made only small financial contributions to the household and for two
years earned no income whatsoever. In January of 1978 Robert Lynn filed for divorce and Bonnie counterclaimed for divorce seeking both alimony and an equitable distribution of the marital
property. Id. Meanwhile, Bonnie's health had deteriorated as a result of Meniere's disease and
she was not able to continue to work after September of 1979. Id. at 514, 453 A.2d at 540. The
chancery division granted the couple a divorce and subsequently the trial court held that professional degrees and licenses were property under New Jersey's equitable distribution statute. Id.,
453 A.2d at 541. In so doing the court ordered Robert Lynn to pay Bonnie 20% of the value
of his degree and license. Id. The court also awarded Bonnie $125 per week in alimony, the cost
of medical coverage and certain medical expenses as well as her attorney fees. Id. at 514-15,
453 A.2d at 541. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted direct certification to hear Robert and
Bonnie Lynn's appeal of the trial court's decision. Id. at 516, 453 A.2d at 542.
In Hill, the second companion case to Mahoney, the supreme court upheld the appellate
division's reversal of the trial court's treatment of a dental degree and license as property subject
to equitable distribution. Hill, 91 N.J. at 510, 453 A.2d at 539. Anita Hill, plaintiff-appellant,
and Robert Hill, defendant-respondent, were married in 1973. Id. at 507, 453 A.2d at 537. Robert
had supported his wife for one year while she attended medical school. Id. at 507-08, 453 A.2d
at 537. In 1975 the couple moved to New Jersey where Robert began dental school. Id. at 508,
453 A.2d at 537. During this time the couple was primarily supported by Anita who worked
as an assistant scientist and substitute teacher. The couple separated in 1978. Id. Subsequently,
Robert completed dental school and became a resident in oral surgery while accumulating about
$30,000 in educational loans, and Anita moved to Boston and enrolled in dental school which
required her to borrow great amounts of money for her education. Id., 453 A.2d at 538. Anita
Hill filed for and was granted a divorce. Id. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $13,000 as
reimbursement for one-half of the amount she contributed to the household while her husband
was in dental school, minus the contributions he had made. Id. at 508-09, 453 A.2d at 538. The
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that a professional degree or license is not property subject to partition upon the dissolution of a marriage. The court did, however, hold
that a spouse is entitled to "reimbursement alimony" as compensation
for supporting a marital partner who has pursued an educational degree
or professional training as long as the party seeking compensation can
show that both parties expected "increased income and material
3
benefits" from the education.
Melvin and June Lee Mahoney were married in Indiana in 1971.4
At that time Melvin had earned a degree in engineering and June Lee
held a bachelor of science degree. 5 Except for the period of time between September of 1975 and January of 1977, when Melvin attended
the University of Pennsylvania in pursuit of a Masters of Business Administration degree (M.B.A.), the couple shared all household expenses
until they separated in October of 1978.6 While her husband was a student, June Lee contributed approximately $24,000 to the household
and Melvin made no financial contribution. 7 His educational expenses,
which totalled about $6,500, were paid by Air Force and other veterans'
benefits. 8 Upon receiving his M.B.A., Melvin became employed by
Chase Manhattan Bank as a commercial lending officer. 9
Melvin sued for divorce in March of 1979, and his wife counterclaimed for the same relief. 10 In May of 1980, the trial court granted
dual judgments of divorce on the basis of an eighteen month continuous
separation. I The only significant issue presented at trial was June Lee's
reimbursement claim for the amount of support which she provided
her husband while he was an M.B.A. student. 12 June Lee claimed entitlement to one-half of her $24,000 contribution to their household
while her husband was a student plus one-half of her husband's $6,500
appellate division reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination
of rehabilitative alimony. Id. at 509, 453 A.2d at 538. Anita Hill appealed and the supreme court
granted certification. Id.
3 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535.
4 Id. at 492, 453 A.2d at 529.
5 Id.
6 Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. In 1976 June Lee Mahoney began a graduate program at Rutgers University while
continuing to work full time. Id. at 493, 453 A.2d at 529. Her educational expenses were paid
by her employer. June Lee received a master's degree in microbiology one year after the separation from her husband. Id.
10 Id.
"
Id. At the time of trial Melvin and June Lee's incomes were $25,600 and $21,000, respectively. The couple had partitioned their personal property by agreement and owned no real property. No claim for alimony was made. Id.
12 Id., 453 A.2d at 529-30.
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tuition expense. 13 The trial court, in accepting June's position, held that
"the education and degree obtained by plaintiff, ... constituted a property right subject to equitable offset upon dissolution of the marriage."' 4 The trial court ordered the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant in the amount of $5,000, to be paid in monthly installments. 15
The appellate division reversed, holding that a professional license
or educational degree is not property subject to equitable distribution l
and that a spouse is not entitled to reimbursement for contributions
made toward the financial support of a marriage partner who is in the
process of earning an educational degree. 17 The appellate division relied
primarily upon the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Stern v.
Stern,18 in which the court held that an individual's increased earning
capacity, even when aided by the efforts of his or her spouse, is not
"property" under New Jersey's equitable distribution statute.19
The appellate division in Mahoney noted that "if the enhanced
earning capacity itself is not distributable property, then neither is the
license or degree which is merely the memorialization of the attainment of the skill, qualifications and educational background which is
the prerequisite of the enhanced earning capacity and on which it is
predicated." 20 The court further suggested that equity could be achieved
for the supporting spouse through the trial judge's consideration of earnId. at 493, 453 A.2d at 530.
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 419 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Ch. Div. 1980),
rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), af'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
The trial court noted that the specific question of whether a professional degree should be property subject to equitable distribution was an issue of first impression in New Jersey. Id. at 445,
419 A.2d at 1150. Additionally, the court acknowledged that although other states disagree in
answering that question, the majority conclude that neither the education nor the degree itself
is quantifiable property subject to partition within a divorce settlement. Id. Nevertheless, the
trial court accepted the minority view that an educational degree is property subject to equitable
distribution as articulated in In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) and
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carrigan in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 434,
574 P.2d 75. (1978) Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 445-47, 419 A.2d 1149, 1150-51
(Ch. Div. 1980), rev'd, 1982 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), aff'd, 91 N.J. 488,
453 A.2d 527 (1982).
11 Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 419 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Ch. Div. 1980),
rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), af'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
The court did not explain its rationale in choosing $5,000 as the amount of the reimbursement. Id.
11 Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), affd, 91 N.J. 488,
453 A.2d 527 (1982).
17 Id.
18 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stern.
19 Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 605, 442 A.2d 1062, 1066 (App. Div.), affd,
91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984)
for New Jersey's equitable distribution statute; see also infra note 32 and accompanying text.
10 Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 605, 442 A.2d 1062, 1066 (App. Div.), aff'd,
91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
13

14
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ing capacity in determining alimony and the distribution of marital
assets. 2 1 On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the appellate
22
division was affirmed.
Traditionally, one method of financially protecting a divorced wife
has been through the grant of an alimony award. 2 3 Alimony is based
upon a husband's obligation to support his wife2 4 and is utilized not
only to support the spouse, but to provide for the care of young children,
to ensure that the spouse does not become dependent upon public support, and to compensate the wife for services rendered during the
marriage. 25 Alimony awards may take the form of permanent alimony,
which continues until the recipient spouse remarries or either spouse
dies, or alimony in gross, which is an award of a definite amount
distributed in either a lump sum or installments. 26 Permanent alimony
may be modified by the courts as7 circumstances of the parties change,
2
but alimony in gross may not.
In recent years new variations on this basic theme have developed,
with some jurisdictions implementing new forms of alimony such as
rehabilitative alimony. 28 Rehabilitative alimony, unlike permanent
alimony, is a temporary award intended to allow the recipient spouse
ample time to find employment or to gain the education or training
29
necessary to compete in the job market and to become self-sufficient.

1 Id. at 613, 442 A.2d at 1070. The appellate court suggested that an award of rehabilitative
alimony would be appropriate in the situation where a wife defers her own educational objectives in order to provide financiar support for her husband during his schooling. Id. at 615, 442
A.2d at 1071-72.
22 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 495, 453 A.2d at 530.
21 The word "alimony" is derived from the Latin "alimonia" which means sustenance. Alimony,
BLACK'S LAW
therefore, is the "sustenance or support of the wife by her divorced husband.
DICTIONARY 67 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
24 H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.1, at 420 (1968).
2I Id. § 14.5, at 441-42. Although today many jurisdictions allow husbands alimony awards,
there exists no reciprocal common law duty for a wife to support her husband. Id. § 14.6, at
448; see Blaine v. Blaine, 96 N.J. Super. 460, 233 A.2d 212 (Ch. Div. 1967).
26 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

67 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). All forms of alimony must be authorized

by statute. H. CLARK, supra note 24, § 14.1, at 421. Temporary alimony, or alimony pendente
lite, is available to a spouse for temporary support in a divorce or separate maintenance action
pending the issuance of a judicial decree. Id. § 14.2, at 422-23. Attorney's fees may also be awarded
in such cases. Id. at 428.
27 H. CLARK, supra note 24, § 14.5, at 447.
' See Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
20 Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law
Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 951. Significantly, a rehabilitative award is
not dependent upon the recipient spouse's financial contributions to his or her partner's education or to the household in general. It is especially useful for relatively young spouses who have
the capacity to make a lifestyle transition. See Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d

1280 (Ch. Div. 1978).
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Similarly, reimbursement alimony sometimes has been used by the
courts. 30 Under this remedy a reimbursement is awarded as compensation for contributions made by one spouse to the other spouse's educational expenses based upon equitable principles, including contract,
31
quasi-contract and constructive trust theories.
In New Jersey, alimony is authorized by statute and is available
to either spouse. 32 The statute specifies three factors as considerations
in determining whether alimony should be awarded and, if so, the
amount awarded: actual need, the ability of the parties to pay, and
the duration of the marriage. 33 Additionally, the court is empowered
to consider all other factors that are "fit, reasonable and just" in determining an alimony award.3 4 These considerations include age, education, mental and physical health, income, earning potential, assets of
the party, marital fault, tax impact of an alimony award, previous
pendente lite payments, the public interest in keeping divorced spouses
from receiving public support funds, and the standard of living to which
the couple was accustomed during their marriage.35 In the past, New
30 E.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
3
Erickson, supra note 29, at 968-70.
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). The statute provides in part:
Pending any matrimonial action brought in this State or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the
court may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, . . . as
the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable
and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders. Upon
neglect or refusal to give such reasonable security, as shall be required, or upon default
in complying with any such order, the court may award and issue process for the
immediate sequestration of the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real
estate of the party so charged, and appoint a receiver thereof, and cause such personal estate and the rents and profits of such real estate, or so much thereof as shall
be necessary, to be applied toward such alimony and maintenance as to the said court
shall from time to time seem reasonable and just; or the performance of the said orders
may be enforced by other ways according to the practice of the court. Orders so made
may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may
require.
In all actions brought for divorce, divorce from bed and board or nullity the
court may award alimony to either party, and in so doing shall consider the actual
need and ability to pay of the parties and the duration of the marriage.
Id.
31 Id. Two other factors are also specified but these only apply in certain circumstances. First,
in all matrimonial actions other than those based upon the ground of separation, "the court may
consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony
.... Second, where a divorce "is granted on the ground of institutionalization for mental illness the court may consider the possible burden upon the taxpayers of the State .
Id.
34 Id.
11 G. SKOLOFF & L. CUTLER, NEW JERSEY FAMILY LAW PRACTICE (4th ed. 1982) § 5.3, at 36-61.
Recently, there has been an attempt to amend New Jersey's alimony provisions. S. 600, 200th
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Jersey courts had generally awarded permanent alimony, which terminates when the recipient spouse remarries or when either spouse
dies. 3 This stance has been eroded in recent years. In Turner v.
Turner,3 7 the chancery court accepted the novel and somewhat revolutionary concept of rehabilitative alimony. 38 In that case, rehabilitative
alimony was defined as "alimony payable for a short, but specific and
terminable period of time, which will cease when the recipient is, in

N.J. Legis., 1st Sess. (1982), if passed, would affect New Jersey's alimony provisions in two ways.
First, the bill would prescribe that an alimony award can be either temporary or permanent
in nature. Id. at 2. This would codify the practices that the courts have utilized in the past based
upon judicial discretion. Second, the bill would list the factors that a court could consider in
determining alimony. The criteria are illustrative rather than comprehensive since other
nonspecified factors can be considered by the court. One factor presently found in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-23 is the duration of the marriage. Significantly, the bill would also include as
criteria:
the age, physical and emotional health of the parties; the standard of living established
in the marriage and the likelihood that the party seeking maintenance can become
self-supporting at a reasonably comparable standard of living, the earning capacities,
educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties; the length of
absence from the job market and custodial responsibilities for children of the party
seeking maintenance; the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education
or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
and the history of the contributions to the marriage by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers
or educational opportunities.
S. 600, 200th N.J. Legis., 1st Sess. (1982).
G. SKOLOFF & L. CUTLER, supra note 35, § 5.5, at 68. Historically, New Jersey alimony
C1
laws are based upon early English common law. Parmly v. Parmly, 125 N.J. Eq. 545, 5 A.2d
789 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939). A divorce was granted by the English ecclesiastical courts or, in
certain cases, by act of Parliament. Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 A. 694 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1902). At common law an ecclesiastical court could only grant a divorce under grounds
that would make the marriage void ab initio. Id. at 751, 52 A. 700. No alimony was granted
in such a case since no valid marriage was recognized. A divorce a mensa et thoro, however,
could be granted in situations where a husband and wife could no longer live together. In such
cases an alimony award was permissible based upon the wife's need and the husband's ability
to pay. Id. In New Jersey, however, jurisdiction was given by statute to the chancery courts over
matters concerning divorce. Paterson's Laws, Act of Dec. 2, 1794, ch. 514, 1794 N.J. Laws 968,
969, § 7. This Act also provided that the chancery courts "shall and may, in every such divorce,
take such order touching the care and maintenance of the children of that marriage, and also
touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife, or any allowance to be made to her, and,
if any, the security to be given for the same, as, from the circumstances of the parties, and nature
of the case, may be fit, equitable and just." Id. Subsequently, the provisions for alimony payments
were liberalized as alimony was allowed in cases of a legal separation and as the grounds for
divorce were expanded. Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 752-53, 52 A. 694, 700 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1902).
31 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (Ch. Div. 1978).
31 Id. at 323, 385 A.2d at 1285. The court noted that the purposes of rehabilitative alimony
are to enable a wife to develop skills necessary to join the work force, to give the husband some
idea as to when his obligation to his wife will cease, and to grant the court leave to decide when
alimony responsibilities will end. Id. at 314-15, 385 A.2d at 1280-81. The court further observed
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the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a position of self-support." 39 Subsequently, in Lepis v. Lepis,40 the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed
its approval of the use of rehabilitative alimony in appropriate circumstances.41
In addition to making determinations regarding alimony, 42 the
43
courts are responsible for effectuating a division of marital assets.
Courts are empowered to transfer the property in specie or require the
transfer of cash, representing the value of such property, in either lump
alimony, a property
sum or installment payments. 44 Unlike permanent
45
division once made may not be modified.
New Jersey is one of approximately forty states that have enacted
in the common law tradition, equitable distribution statutes. 46 The New
Jersey statute provides that in the case of divorce or divorce from bed
and board 47 the court may "effectuate an equitable distribution of the
that the use of rehabilitative alimony would actually encourage divorced women to acquire training
and to seek employment. Id. at 317, 385 A.2d at 1282.
39 Id. at 314, 385 A.2d at 1280.
40 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980).
41 Id. at 155 n.9, 416 A.2d at 53 n.9. The court opined that rehabilitative alimony is an
available option but only after the trial court has made an investigation into the wife's employment capabilities. Id.
42 H. CLARK, supra note 24, § 14.8, at 449. There is a significant interrelationship between
alimony and equitable distribution. The primary purpose of alimony is to aid in the support of
a spouse while the function of property distribution is to acknowledge the contribution that each
spouse has made in the acquisition of marital property. G. SKOLOFF & L. CUTLER, supra note
35, § 5.1, at 9.
41 There are two fundamental systems in the United States which classify marital property
and dictate its treatment. Eight states have community property systems: Louisiana, Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, California, Washington, Idaho, and Nevada. All other states are common law
jurisdictions. Hennell, Community Property with Right of Survivorship, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
779 n.1 (1983); see generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGIHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
(2d ed. 1971).
In community property jurisdictions, the purpose of the division is to divide the property
of the community and to give each spouse his or her share. H. CLARK, supra note 24, at 450.
While property owned before marriage and property acquired gratuitously after marriage remain the separate property of the recipient, any assets procured during the marriage are classified
as community property. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 92 (2d ed. 1975). Alternatively, in strict common law property jurisdictions each spouse owns what he or she individually
acquires, whether before or after the marriage. Only property obtained with joint funds are subject
to division upon a divorce. Erickson, supra note 29, at 961. Nevertheless, many common law
and community property states have enacted statutes which state that property subject to division is allocated in such a manner as is fair and equitable. H. CLARK, supra note 24, at 451. This
scheme generally provides that all property acquired during marriage in states based on a common law tradition is divisible equitably, while community property jurisdictions provide that
only assets designated as community property are subject to equitable distribution. The exact
procedures vary from state to state. Id.
44 H. CLARK, supra note 24, at 452.
45 Id. at 449.
46 G. SKOLOFF & L. CUTLER, supra note 35, § 6.1, at 4.
47 A divorce from bed and board is -(a) partial or qualified divorce, by which the parties
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property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially
acquired by [both], or either of them during the marriage. '48 Since

there is no legislative history dealing with equitable distribution under
the Divorce Reform Act, 49 and since the Act provides no specific stand50
ards, the trial courts possess broad discretion in its application.
The purpose of New Jersey's equitable distribution law is to permit the courts to partition the marital assets equitably between the
spouses. 51 Assets subject to a division include most property that has
been acquired by either spouse, or both spouses jointly, during their

are separated and forbidden to live or cohabit together, without affecting the marriage itself."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23; see supra note 32 for text of statute.
" Act of June 14, 1971, ch. 212, 1971 N.J. Laws 1022. The Divorce Reform Act was a comprehensive attempt by the state legislature to review New Jersey's divorce law. See Painter v.
Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 203, 320 A.2d 484, 487-88 (1974). Most of the changes in the divorce law
dealt with the revision and expansion of the grounds for divorce. Id. The provision for the equitable
distribution of property was included in the Divorce Reform Act by amendment without specific
mention within the title of the Act. Id. at 207, 320 A.2d at 490. Prior to the passage of New
Jersey's equitable distribution statute there was no provision for distribution of marital assets.
Note, New Jersey Courts Make FirstEquitableDistributionof Property Under New DivorceAct,
4 SETON HALL L. REv. 311 (1972). The sole responsibility of the trial court before the adoption
of the distribution provision was merely to determine the separate property of each spouse and
to divide equally the property held jointly. Id. at 313.
10 G. SKoLoF' & L. CuTLER, supra note 35, § 6.1, at 4.
,1 Although N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 provides no guidelines for the granting of an
equitable distribution of property, case law has attempted to fill the void. In Painter v. Painter,
65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Justice Mountain listed with approval several factors which
the trial court had considered in making an equitable distribution of marital property upon the
granting of a divorce. Id. at 211, 320 A.2d at 492. These factors included:
(1) Respective age, background and earning ability of the parties; (2) duration of
the marriage; (3) the standard of living of the parties during the marriage; (4) what
money or property each brought into the marriage; (5) the present income of the
parties; (6) the property acquired during the marriage by either or both parties; (7)
the source of acquisition; (8) the current value and income producing capacity of
the property; (9) the debts and liabilities of the parties to the marriage; (10) the present mental and physical health of the parties; (11) the probability of continuing present
employment at previous earnings or better in the future; (12) effect of distribution
of assets on the ability to pay alimony and support, and (13) gifts from one spouse
to the other during the marriage.
Id. Justice Mountain also added tax consequences and trust fund provisions as additional factors
to be considered. Id. at 212-13, 320 A.2d at 493. Recently, an attempt was made in the legislature
to codify the factors that should be considered by judges in making an equitable distribution
award. S. 600, 200th N.J. Legis., 1st Sess. (1982) would amend N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 and
would take into consideration factors such as the duration of the marriage, the age and health
of the parties, income and property of each of the parties, earning capacity, tax consequences
and liabilities.
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or wife before marriage
marriage .52 Property owned by the husband
53
is not subject to equitable distribution.
In Rothman v. Rothman,5 4 the New Jersey Supreme Court extensively examined the conceptual underpinnings of equitable distribution for the first time.5 - The Rothman court noted that equitable
distribution effectuates at least two public policy concerns. First,
equitable distribution protects a spouse by acting as an alternative or
complement to court ordered alimony.56 Alimony alone may not sufficiently protect a spouse because under this scheme, payments may be
discontinued permanently if the party responsible for making such
payments dies, or may be temporarily interrupted if financial difficulties
prevent the payor from meeting the obligation.5 7 Second, the concept
of equitable distribution "gives recognition to the essential supportive
role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as a homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled to a share of
58
family assets accumulated during the marriage.Justice Mountain, writing for a unanimous court in Rothman,
noted that a trial judge must utilize a three-step process in making an
equitable distribution of marital property.59 He must first determine
the distributable assets of each party; second, he must place a value
51 Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974). In Painter,the court included property acquired by "gift, bequest, devise, descent" and other similar ways as eligible
for distribution. Id., 320 A.2d at 494. Nevertheless, the legislature subsequently passed an amendment which states in pertinent part that:
all such property, real, personal or otherwise, legally or beneficially acquired during the marriage by either party by gift, devise, or bequest shall not be subject to
equitable distribution, except that interspousal gifts shall be subject to equitable
distribution.
P.L. 1980, ch. 181.
11 Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974). The Painter court also
noted that any increase in value of property separately held by a spouse prior to marriage is immune to distribution. Id. Likewise, the court acknowledged that:
the income or other usufruct derived from such property, as well as any asset for
which the original property may be exchanged or into which it, or the proceeds of
its sale, may be traceable shall similarly be considered the separate property of the
particular spouse.
Id.
65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
55 Id. at 228, 320 A.2d at 501.
56Id. at 228-29, 320 A.2d at 501.
57 Id.
5 Id. at 229, 320 A.2d at 501. The New Jersey statute in existence before the adoption of
the equitable distribution provision was deemed inequitable by one New Jersey court because
it prevented the wife from sharing in the property of her husband that was acquired while she
acted as homemaker, mother, and other roles which assisted the husband in the acquisition of
wealth. Tucker v. Tucker, 121 N.J. Super. 539, 545, 298 A.2d 91, 94 (Ch. Div. 1972).
" Rothman, 65 N.J. at 232, 320 A.2d at 503.
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upon each asset; finally, the trial judge must make an equitable allocation of the property.60 The court rejected the proposition that each division should begin with the presumption of a fifty-fifty distribution to
be adjusted by the various circumstances of the case. Instead it stressed
that each situation should be examined individually.6 1
While the equitable allocation of the marital property is undoubtedly the most troublesome portion of the Rothman three-step process because of its subjective nature, much litigation has occurred regarding the type of "property" contemplated by New Jersey's equitable
distribution law. 62 Before Mahoney, the New Jersey Supreme Court
had never examined the issue of whether a professional degree was property subject to equitable distribution. 3 Other jurisdictions, however,
have examined this issue with most courts holding that an advanced
degree or a professional license is not property.6 Within this group refusing to recognize a property right, there has been a split of opinion concerning the exact treatment of the educational degree. Some jurisdictions have not awarded a spouse any direct compensation for supporting a student spouse except traditional alimony awards and property
division. 5 Others have granted the supporting spouse some form
of reimbursement founded upon a variety of theories. 6 Still other courts
have analyzed the problem in terms not of whether a degree itself is

60 Id.

61 Id. at 232-33 n.6, 320 A.2d at 503 n.6.
02 In general the Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted a very liberal interpretation of
the word "property." Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 495, 453 A.2d at 531. New Jersey courts have held
many types of assets to be subject to equitable distribution including acres of farmland, Gauger
v. Gauger, 73 N.J. 538, 376 A.2d 523 (1977); a workman's compensation claim, Hughes v. Hughes,
132 N.J. Super. 559, 334 A.2d 379 (Ch.Div. 1975); potential recovery of a spouse's negligence
action, Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (App. Div. 1974); joint bank
accounts, Kyzyma v. Kyzyma, 117 N.J. Super. 472, 285 A.2d 76 (Ch.Div. 1971). But cJ. McCarty
v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 219 (1971), where the Supreme Court of the United States held that federal
retirement pay was not subject to state law.
Assembly Bill 1896 would exempt property acquired by intestate succession from equitable
distribution and Assembly Bill 2176 would provide that pension fund payments would not be
considered property subject to equitable distribution. See A. 1896, 200th N.J. Legis., 1st Sess.
(1982); A. 2176, 200th N.J. Legis., 1st Sess. (1982).
63 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at 531.
64 E.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of

Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.
1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis.
2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
65 E.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
80 E.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
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property, but of whether the future earning potential that is attached
to the degree is property. 7
Illustrative of the total rejection of special means of compensation is In re Marriage of Graham.68 In that case the Supreme Court
of Colorado rejected the contention that a husband's M.B.A. degree
was property subject to division despite the fact that the defendant's
wife contributed seventy percent of the couple's total income to the
household while her husband attended graduate school.69 The court
in Graham pointed out the differences between an educational degree
and more conventional notions of property: An educational degree cannot be sold or transferred in any way, it is extinguished upon the death
of its holder, and is merely a memorialization of the "cumulative prodduct of many years of previous education, combined with diligence
and hard work.- 70 The court further justified its position by observing
that an advanced degree is an "intellectual achievement" not attainable
7
through merely monetary means. 1

Significantly, the Graham court bolstered its holding by stating
that spouses who support their partners possess various remedies derived from the marital relationship.7 2 In a marriage where one spouse
has contributed to the other's education and marital assets have been
accumulated, the trial court can take this into account in its ultimate
division of the property. 73 Conversely, a lack of accumulated assets may
also be considered by the court in making an alimony award.74
Justice Carrigan registered a strong dissent in Graham, arguing
that it was "a matter of economic reality" that the husband's increased
earning capacity was the most significant asset of the marriage. 75 He
asserted that equitable principles should prevail over "traditional narrow concepts of property.

'7

The dissent suggested that a spouse's

income-earning potential should be subject to division as part of a prop-

07

E.g., Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1979); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J.

540, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
" 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
00 Id. at 432-34, 574 P.2d at 77-78.
70

Id.

71

72

Id.
Id. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78.

73

Id.

Id.
Id. at 434, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
71 Id. Justice Carrigan noted that the wife in Graham made an investment in her husband's
education. He also acknowledged that Graham represented the familiar situation where the wife
supported her husband while he continued his education, only to be divorced by her husband
after he received his degree. The dissent concluded that "equity demands that courts seek extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice." Id.
74

71
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erty settlement, and analogized the situation to one in which a widow
is entitled to recover for the loss of anticipated future earnings when
77
her husband has been wrongfully killed.
Arizona, a community property state, has upheld the Graham
court's rejection of an educational degree as a form of property. The
Arizona Supreme Court examined the nature of a professional degree
in Wisner v. Wisner .78 An ex-wife appealed a decision by the trial court
which had held that her ex-husband's medical license, board certificate,
and the value of his education were not part of the couple's community property. 79 Mrs. Wisner argued that she was entitled to one-half
the value of those items or, alternatively, that she should be reimbursed
for her contribution toward their acquisition under a theory of unjust
enrichment. 80
The Wisner court agreed with the Graham majority and held that
education, as an intangible, was not properly characterized as property
and therefore was not subject to a division. 8' The court stated, however,
that education and the accompanying possibility of increased earnings
are still important considerations in determining an equitable property split, maintenance payments, or child support.812 The Wisner court
also rejected any claim of unjust enrichment, stating that such a claim
is inapplicable to a marital relationship because marriage, unlike a
business agreement, is not an "arm's length transaction. ' 83 The court
noted, however, that spouses retain the right to make a contract specifying their respective rights and duties and in the absence of such an
agreement, it should be presumed that the decision that one spouse

77 Id. at 435, 574 P.2d at 79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that the wife
in Graham, and all spouses in similar cases, should perhaps be allowed to recover in a suit based
on implied debt, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or some other legal theory. Id.
78 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981).
11 Id. at 335, 631 P.2d at 117.
10 Id. at 339, 631 P.2d at 121.
81 Id. at 340, 631 P.2d at 122.
82 Id. at 340-41, 631 P.2d at 122-23; accord Graham, 574 P.2d at 75.
83 Wisner, 129 Ariz. at 341, 631 P.2d at 123. The Wisner court noted that:

[I]n the absence of such an agreement, we believe it is improper for a court to treat
a marriage as an arm's length transaction by allowing a spouse to come into court
after the fact and make legal arguments regarding unjust enrichment by reason of
the other receiving further education during coverture. In the absence of a specific
agreement, such legal arguments simply do not fit in the context of a marital relationship. In each marriage, for example, the couple decides on a certain division of
labor, and while there is a value to what each spouse is doing, whether it be labor
for monetary compensation or homemaking, that value is consumed by the community
in the on-going relationship and forms no basis for a claim of unjust enrichment upon
dissolution.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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should continue his or her education was mutual and made with
84
awareness of the sacrifices that would be needed to further that goal.
Other states have attempted to accommodate the interests of a
spouse who has contributed substantial financial support to enable a
marital partner to continue an education only to be handed divorce
papers before any benefit can be derived from the increased earning
potential.8 5 In In re Marriage of Lundberg,86 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that compensation for a person who supports his or her
spouse while the spouse is pursuing an advanced degree can be obtained
by expanding the traditional roles of property division and maintenance
payments.8 7 The court redefined maintenance "as a flexible tool
available to the trial court to ensure a fair and equitable determination in each individual case," and rejected the traditional practice of
providing such payments only when a spouse was incapable of selfsupport. 88 Although the Lundberg court did not authorize a specific
formula to be used to provide reimbursement, it did state that "[a] trial
court should examine all the relevant circumstances of a particular case
and may employ maintenance, property division or a combination of
the two in order to fairly compensate a spouse .... The goal in such
cases is always to achieve a fundamentally fair and equitable result."8 9

14 Id.; see also Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). In Frausto, the
court held that "a professional education acquired during marriage is not a property right and
is not divisible upon divorce." Id. at 659. The court also ruled that reimbursement for expenses
paid by one spouse so that the other could continue his or her education was not available when
expenses were paid from community funds. Id. at 660; cf. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.
1972) (good will of husband's medical practice was not community property subject to division).
85 E.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
11 107 Wis. 2d 1,318 N.W.2d 918 (1982). In this case the wife supported the household while
her husband attended medical school. Id. at 3, 318 N.W.2d at 919.
87 Id. at 10, 318 N.W.2d at 922. The court noted that "[i]n a sense, [the husband's] medical
degree is the most significant asset of the marriage. It is only fair that Judy be compensated for
her costs and foregone opportunities resulting from her support of David while he was in school."
Id. at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
8 Id. at 12, 318 N.W.2d at 923.
89 Id. at 15, 318 N.W.2d at 924. The Lundberg court found it significant that Wisconsin
law listed several factors to be taken into account by the trial court in compensating a spouse
upon a divorce. Id. at 12-14, 318 N.W.2d at 923-24. The court noted that one factor to consider
in making a property division under the statute was "[tihe contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other." Id. at 11, 318 N.W.2d at 923 (citing
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.255 (5) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (recodified as Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255
(5) (West 1981)). Since this only delivered an equitable result when there was sufficient marital
property held by the couple, the Wisconsin court utilized maintenance as a means to do equity
in the situation where a wife supported her husband while he attended school without a significant accumulation of marital property. Id.
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Another approach to this issue was taken in Hubbardv. Hubbard.90
In that case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a wife has the
right to be compensated for the amount of her investment in her husband's education and training."' The court relied on principles of "equity
and natural justice" in order to prevent unjust enrichment by the
husband,92 basing its ruling on the dissenting opinion in Graham which
had suggested the use of a quasi-contract theory as the method of
recovery.93 The court noted that the wife in Hubbard made financial
and other sacrifices in anticipation of future rewards based on her husband's earning potential as a physician. 94 The court saw no reason for
the husband to retain, in effect, the only asset of the marriage, his education, without some benefit inuring to the wife.95 Nevertheless, the Hubbard court limited the wife's recovery to contributions she had made
to her husband's direct support, education, and professional training
expenses, plus interest and inflation adjustments.96 Thus, the Oklahoma
court refused to grant the wife any award based on her husband's future
7
earnings .
While some courts have looked at the issue of whether a professional degree is subject to equitable distribution, other courts have
characterized a professional degree as an embodiment of future earning capacity and have examined whether the future earning capacity

The Lundberg court also noted that Wisconsin law listed factors in determining maintenance
payments including the educational level of each individual as well as:
The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance including educational
background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from
the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find
employment.
Id. at 12 n.2, 318 N.W.2d at 923 n.2. In recognizing the various factors listed by the legislature
for determining proper compensation, the court determined that it was the legislative intent not
to limit maintenance to cases where a spouse is incapable of self-support. Id. at 12-13, 318 N.W.
2d at 923.
90 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
91 Id. at 750.
92 Id.
11 Id. at 751.
94 Id.
95 Id.

9 Id. at 752.
Id. A similar outcome can be found in DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.
I'
1981). In this case the wife supported her husband while he attended college and medical school
but the two separated before a medical degree was attained. Id. at 756-67. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, through a restitutionary remedy, allowed the wife to recover her contributions to her
spouse while he attended school. Id. at 759. The court based its award on the amount of money
contributed by the wife to her husband's living expenses and educational costs, minus the wife's
own living expenses. The court expressed this concept in a formula:
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itself is subject to distribution. 8 The Supreme Court of Iowa in In re
9 concluded
Marriage of Horstmann"
that a professional degree is not
an asset distributable after a divorce but nevertheless held that the increased earning potential made possible by the educational degree did
constitute an asset subject to distribution.10° The Horstmann court
authorized the trial court to consider the future earning capacities of
both parties, including their education, skill, or talent, in making an
equitable distribution of property and in determining the amount of
alimony that should be awarded.' 0 ' Alternatively, if proper evidence
concerning the value of future earning capacity could not be introduced,
the Iowa court allowed the trial court to consider the cost of an individual's education as a proper factor in awarding distribution or
102
alimony.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also examined the nature
and disposition of future earnings within the context of New Jersey's
equitable distribution statute. In Stern v. Stern,"13 a wife wanted her
husband's future earning capacity considered as a separate item of proWorking spouse's financial contributions to joint living expenses and educational costs
of student spouse
less
one half (Working spouse's financial contributions plus student spouse's financial contributions (including student spouse's earnings, loans, grants and other sources of income) less cost of education)
equals
equitable award to working spouse
Id. Thus, all the educational expenses and one-half of the living expenses were imputed to the
student spouse. Id.
98 See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
-- 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
Io Id. at 891. The Horstmann court examined the nature of a law degree and stated that while
the law degree or the certificate of admission to practice law was not an asset itself, "it is the
potential for increase in future earning capacity made possible by the law degree and certificate
of admission conferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the
asset for distribution by the court." Id. But cf. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d
792 (Ct. App. 1977), wherein an Indiana appellate court ruled that the future earnings of the
husband were not property subject to division as part of a divorce settlement and refused to award
maintenance in excess of the actual physical assets of a marriage because of the application of
a statute which limited maintenance payments to spouses who were physically or mentally incapacitated. Id. at 664-65, 365 N.E.2d at 795.
10, Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d at 891.
102 Id. California, in contrast, has consistently held that education is not property subject to
division even if the education has been obtained through community funds. Todd v. Todd, 272
Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1969); accord In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134
Cal. App. 3d 484, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. 1982) (education acquired by one spouse, with
financial and emotional support of other during marriage, is neither separate nor community
property that is divisible as part of divorce settlement).
103 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
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perty entitling her to an equitable share.1 0 4 While Stern, unlike
Mahoney, did not involve the characterization of a professional degree,
it did concern the nature of future earnings, a question strikingly similar
05
to that presented in Mahoney.1
In Stern, the trial court awarded the defendant's former wife
alimony, child support, and $100,000 as an equitable distribution of
the defendant's share of the marital assets, including an interest in a
law partnership and the husband's future earning capacity.10 6 On appeal, the defendant conceded that although a partnership in a law firm
is property, earning capacity itself should not be considered a separate
asset. 0 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted the defendant's contention that "a person's earning capacity, even where its development
has been aided and enhanced by the other spouse, ... should not be
recognized as a separate, particular item of property."' 0 8 The court
recognized, however, that earning capacity is an important factor in
making decisions regarding both equitable distribution of the other assets
and alimony.10 9
The highest courts of various states have perpetuated the confusion reflected in the broad range of theories put forth in the above cases
by reversing the decisions of trial or appellate courts which held that
104 See

id. at 344, 331 A.2d at 260.

105 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532.
101 Stern, 66 N.J. at 344, 331 A.2d at 259-60. The trial court included the defendant-lawyer's

future earning capacity as property. Id. The trial court stated that:
His [earning capacity] is an amorphous asset of this marriage in the absence of other
assets. It consists of natural ability, undergraduate and postgraduate education, marriage to the daughter of a man of high standing and lucrative income in the area
of his professional activity, entree' to his office and ultimate partnership, subsequent
management of the firm, with advancement in the esteem of his professional peers.
Id. at 345, 331 A.2d at 260 (citing Stern v. Stern, 123 N.J. Super. 566, 568, 304 A.2d 204 (Ch.
Div. 1973), afJ'd, 128 N.J. Super. 198, 319 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1974), rev'd, 66 N.J. 340, 331
A.2d 257 (1975)).
107 Stern, 66 N.J. at 344, 331 A.2d at 260.
108 Id. at 345, 331 A.2d at 260.
1o Id. The trial court in Mahoney distinguished Stern's holding that a professional degree was
property. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (Ch. Div. 1980), rev'd,
182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), aJ'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). The
Mahoney trial court compared earning capacity with the "intrinsic value of an educational degree"
and suggested that Stern did not adequately address the latter. Id. at 445, 419 A.2d at 1150.
In Stern, the court suggested that goodwill, on the other hand, could be subject to equitable
distribution. 66 N.J. at 345-47 n.5, 331 A.2d at 261 n.5. Recently, in Dugen v. Dugen, 92 N.J.
423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983), the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly enunciated the principle that
goodwill is an asset subject to equitable distribution. Id. at 433, 457 A.2d at 6. It has been argued
that if goodwill is recognized as intangible property, then a professional degree, or the future
earnings it represents, should also be afforded the same treatment. See Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce: Social Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA
L. REV. 1181, 1211-12 (1981).
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education or future earnings were marital assets."10 Against this
backdrop of uncertainty and inconsistency, New Jersey examined the
nature of a higher educational degree within the framework of its
equitable distribution statute.
The Mahoney court acknowledged that there is no legislative
history to serve as a guide in determining the meaning of the word
"property" as it is used in New Jersey's equitable distribution statute,
and that the statute itself offers no clear indication of whether professional degrees and licenses should be treated as property."' Justice
Pashman, writing for a unanimous court," 2 noted that the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the past had given an "expansive interpretation" to
the word property.1 3 Nevertheless, Pashman wrote "[t]his Court ...
has never subjected to equitable distribution an asset whose future
monetary value is as uncertain and unquantifiable as a professional
14
degree or license.""
The court accepted the Graham court's characterization of the
nature of a degree or professional license as an inalienable personal
achievement of the holder which possesses an uncertain value" 5 and
contrasted the degree with the relative definiteness of an unmatured
pension which provides a specific amount of money at a specific date.",
Additionally, Justice Pashman observed that "[t]he value of a professional degree for purposes of property distribution [is] nothing more
than the possibility of enhanced earnings that the particular academic
credential will provide.""17 In equating a professional degree with future
110E.g., Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); Graham, 194 Colo. at 429, 574 P.2d
at 75. In New York, another state in which there is confusion over this issue, two trial courts
handed down contradictory decisions within one day of each other. See Skoloff, supra note 1.
.. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 495, 453 A.2d at 531. In Hill v. Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 509-10, 453 A.2d
537, 538 (1982), one of the companion cases to Mahoney, the court reiterated its position that
a reimbursement is only proper when one spouse has made financial contributions to the other
with the expectation that both will acquire a significant monetary and tangible benefit. In Lynn
v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 517, 453 A.2d 539, 542 (1982), the second companion case to Mahoney,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that equitable distribution of the husband's medical degree
was improper and therefore provided the wife "a generous but fair award of alimony."
12 Id. at 506, 453 A.2d at 537. Similarly, Lynn and Hill, the two companion cases to Mahoney
were written by Justice Pashman for a unanimous court.
13 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 495, 453 A.2d at 531; see, e.g., Kikkert v. Kikkert, 88 N.J. 4, 438
A.2d 317 (1981) (private pensions); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977) (disability
benefits); Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (App. Div. 1974) (personal
injury claims); Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J. Super. 559, 334 A.2d 379 (Ch. Div. 1975) (worker's
compensation claim). But see Amato v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210, 434 A.2d 639 (App. Div.
1981) (appellate division reversed trial court's decision granting husband share of wife's potential medical malpractice award).
11 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at 531.
IId. See discussion of Graham at supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
16 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at 531.
17 Id. at 496-97, 453 A.2d at 532.
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earning capacity, the court was obliged to rely on its analysis in Stern
where an enhanced earning capacity, irrespective of a spouse's contribution thereto, was not recognized as property within New Jersey's
8
equitable distribution law."i
The Mahoney court noted that New Jersey's equitable distribution statute requires only the division of property acquired during the
marriage; any income earned after the marriage is exempt from the
operation of the statute."" Further, the court observed that even if
enhanced earnings were to be held divisible, it would be nearly impossible to ascertain the correct valuation of a professional degree. 120
Justice Pashman found that valuation would not only entail the use
of complex calculations, but would produce merely an estimate of an
individual's future income.' 21 Even if a reasonable calculation could
be made, a plethora of potential events could influence earning
capacity. 21 2 Additionally, Justice Pashman noted that an inequitable
result would be achieved if a court erred in determining the worth of
a license or degree since an equitable distribution award, unlike alimony, is permanent and thus not subject to modification should cir23
cumstances change. 1
The Mahoney court surveyed the decisions from other jurisdictions
and concluded that a professional education should not be subject to
equitable distribution even if found to be a marital asset. 124 The court
accepted the appellate division's conclusion that the cost of a profesl"8 Id. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532.
Ito Id.; accord In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979)
(any division of earnings based on legal education would be distribution of post-dissolution
property).
120 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532.
121 Id. The equation becomes even more complicated when one considers that the calculated
increased earnings would have to be reduced by the amount the spouse would have earned if
employed during the time he or she was attending school. Id. (citing Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182
N.J. Super. 598, 609, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), aff'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982)). This
adjustment is based on the proposition that an individual who was motivated to pursue a professional education would channel that drive to other income earning occupations. Id.
122 Id. Some of these uncertainties include the fact that an educated individual
may decide
to abandon his profession, may be unsuccessful within it, "or may practice in a specialty, location or manner which generates less than the average income enjoyed by fellow professionals."
Id. at 498, 453 A.2d at 532 (citing DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Ct.
App. 1980)).
123 Id. The court noted that most courts examining the nature of professional degrees failed to
subject them to equitable distribution upon dissolution of a marriage. Nevertheless, the court
also observed that jurisdictions have allowed a wife to recover the amount of financial contribution she made in supporting the household while the husband furthered his education. Id., 453
A.2d at 533; see, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa
1978).
124 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 499, 453 A.2d at 533.
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sional degree does not accurately reflect its true worth and, therefore,
does not account for the nonmonetary contributions made by the degree
holder in its acquisition. 2 5 Additionally, Justice Pashman noted that
any decision which accepted the cost basis of valuing a degree was
theoretically based not on a property rationale but on the equitable
principle that a spouse who supported his or her partner should be reimbursed for payments to the household since the expected future benefits
to the familial unit were never realized. 26 Justice Pashman acknowledged, however, the necessity of some form of recovery in certain
situations. 127 He recognized that the trial court in this case had, in effect, based its award to the wife on a reimbursement theory rather than
on an equitable distribution theory. 128
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of New Jersey accepted
the concept of reimbursement in certain situations, reimbursement was
not supported as an overall policy. 2 9 The court clearly enunciated its
opinion that "[m]arriage is not a business arrangement in which the
parties keep track of debits and credits," but rather is like a joint venture or partnership where each party shares in the fortune of the other. 130
Nevertheless, Justice Pashman held that "[w]here a partner to marriage takes the benefits of his spouse's support in obtaining a profes125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533. The court also partially based its recognition of the concept
of reimbursement alimony on the remedial parts of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984) which provide that a fundamental function of alimony is to support and maintain
the standard of living of the dependent spouse. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501-02, 453 A.2d at 534.
The Mahoney court compared the use of reimbursement alimony, in this context, with its previous
application of "rehabilitative alimony." Id. at 502, 453 A.2d at 534; see also Lepis, 83 N.J. at
155 n.9, 416 A.2d at 53 n.9.
Justice Pashman also observed that New Jersey's alimony statute provided for alimony as
a flexible remedy to be adapted to each individual case and he determined that the alimony statute's
requirement of an award that is "fit, reasonable and just" allows the court a great deal of discretion. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502, 453 A.2d at 534. Consequently, Pashman concluded that "[n]othing
in the statute precludes the court from considering marital conduct-such as one spouse contributing to the career of the other with the expectation of material benefit-in fashioning alimony
awards." Id.
128 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 499, 453 A.2d at 533. Justice Pashman noted that, in actuality, the
trial court did not attempt to place a specific value upon the M.B.A. degree but rather allowed
the wife " 'a reasonable sum as a credit . . on behalf of the maintenance of the household and
the support of the plaintiff during the educational period' " despite the fact that the trial court
couched its award within property distribution terminology. Id. (citing Mahoney v. Mahoney,
175 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 419 A.2d 1149, 1151, rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App.
Div.), affd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982)).
129 Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533.
130 Id.; see Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 141,
417 A.2d 1003, 1005 (1980) (concept of marriage issimilar to that of partnership); Rothman,
501 65 N.J. at 219, 229, 320 A.2d at 496 (marriage "is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking,
that in many ways is akin to a partnership").
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sional degree or license with the understanding that future benefits will
accrue and inure to both of them, and the marriage is then terminated
without the supported spouse giving anything in return, an unfairness
31
has occurred that calls for a remedy."'
The Mahoney court noted that the wife had made monetary contributions towards her husband's education in anticipation of a future
return based upon the advanced degree.1 32 Consequently, Justice
Pashman decided that it would be "patently unfair" for the noncontributing spouse to leave the marriage, not only with the degree, but
also with the increased earning potential represented by the degree,
without having incurred any future obligation to the spouse who helped
make it possible. 133 To heighten the perceived inequity of the situation,
the court also pointed out other less tangible contributions and sacrifices
made by one spouse in a marriage where the other spouse is still in
school. 134 Since factors such as marital support and standard of living
are significant in the consideration of an alimony award, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey introduced the concept of reimbursement alimony
in order to redress the inequities involved when one spouse experiences
a reduction of support, a lower standard of living, or "[h]as been deprived of a better standard of living in the future."'1 35 The Mahoney
court also advocated the use of reimbursement alimony as a flexible
tool to compensate a person who contributed to the support of his or
her student spouse in spite of additional awards of permanent alimony
or equitable distribution of marital property. 36 The court provided that
reimbursement should be made for all support costs including "household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and any other
contributions used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree
1 37
or license."'
The Mahoney court made clear, however, that reimbursement
alimony did not necessarily entitle every individual who helped to support a spouse during the quest for an advanced degree to such a remedy. 38 Significantly, the court limited the use of reimbursement, stating
131Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533.
132

Id.

133 Id.,

453 A.2d at 533-34.
at 500-01, 453 A.2d at 534. The court recognized that not only had the contributing
wife supported the household financially, but she undoubtedly had endured a lowered standard
of living since she had neglected her own financial opportunities while consenting to her husband's desire to further his education. Additionally, her husband would otherwise be employed
if not in school, thereby further benefitting the couple's standard of living. Id.
11. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534 (emphasis added).
134 Id.

136Id.
137 Id.

138Id. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535.
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that "[o]nly monetary contributions made with the mutual and shared
expectation that both parties to the marriage will derive increased income and mutual benefits should be the basis for such an award."' 13 9
The court specifically rejected the use of reimbursement alimony in
situations in which traditional alimony and equitable distribution ade140
quately protected the rights of each party in a divorce action.
The Mahoney court posed several situations in order to demonstrate
the various options available to spouses faced with a divorce action.
The court suggested that rehabilitative alimony might be a favorable
alternative to reimbursement alimony in a situation where the wife
gave up the opportunity to further her education for the sake of her
husband's career plans. 141 Thus, Justice Pashman noted that in this situation either a lump sum or short term periodic payments could be used
to allow the wife to continue her own education or to take other actions to establish her self-sufficiency. 2 Conversely, he found that where
a wife was already self-sufficient or was precluded for some reason from
rejoining the work force, rehabilitative alimony would be
inappropriate."43 Similarly, reimbursement alimony would be inappropriate, according to the court, in the case of a marriage of long duration in which a large amount of marital property had been acquired,
since any inequity between the parties could be overcome through an
equitable distribution of the marital assets. 44 The Mahoney court concluded that a spouse's increased earning capacity, made possible by
an advanced degree, could be considered a factor in making a fair divi45
sion of such property.
According to Justice Pashman, a spouse could also be compensated
through an award of permanent alimony based upon the other spouse's
enhanced earning potential. 14 He reasoned that since the equitable
distribution statute states that alimony awards must take into consideration the supporting spouse's ability to pay, earning potential remains
...Id. The court noted that "[t]hose spouses supported through professional school should
recognize that they may be called upon to reimburse the supporting spouses for the financial
contributions they received in pursuit of their professional training. And they cannot deny the
basic fairness of this result." Id.
41 Id. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535. The court suggested that reimbursement alimony would not
be appropriate since "it is unlikely that a financially successful executive's spouse, who, after
many years of homemaking, returns to school, would upon divorce be required to reimburse
her husband for his contributions to her degree." Id.
14
Id. at 504, 453 A.2d at 535.
142Id.
14 Id.
143

Id., 453 A.2d at 535-36.
Id.

16

Id. at 504-05, 453 A.2d at 536.

144
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an important factor to consider in determining an award. 47 The
Mahoney court found that alimony could be used not only to prevent
a spouse from becoming a burden on the public, but also to allow a
spouse to partake in the assets accumulated during a marriage. 48 The
court concluded that alimony might in fact be a preferable remedial
option since it could be adjusted should the increased earning power
49
of an individual turn out to be greater than anticipated.
Justice Pashman further observed that, in the Mahoneys' case, the
wife supported her husband while he pursued an M.B.A. degree with
the expectation that future material benefits would inure to both of
them. 150 Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court to fashion
5
an award based upon the criteria set forth in the decision.1 1
The true significance of the Mahoney decision is that the New
Jersey Supreme Court has provided trial courts with a great deal of
discretion in fashioning an appropriate award for a former spouse. As
the Mahoney court observed, all too often one spouse has made great
sacrifices so that the other spouse can further his or her education
only to be served with divorce papers when the degree holder is on
the verge of a lucrative new career. 52 In many instances, this apparent
inequity is redressed through an appropriate property distribution or
alimony award. 53 In other situations, however, no remedy is readily
available because of the lack of marital assets in the case of a property
division or the lack of need in the case of an alimony award.1 5 4 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed this inequitable happenstance
by utilizing a flexible approach toward alimony payments. 55 In addition to traditional and rehabilitative alimony the New Jersey Supreme
Court, through Mahoney, has augmented a trial court's options in deal-6
ing with divorce situations by authorizing reimbursement alimony. 15
The Mahoney court's recognition of reimbursement alimony is
auspicious. When other practical considerations are examined, the pre147

Id.

Id. at 505, 453 A.2d at 536.
Id.
150Id. at 506, 453 A.2d at 536.
151Id.
152 Research has not discovered a case in which the principle issue was a husband's demand
148
140

for some compensation for supporting his wife while she pursued an advanced degree. Nevertheless, in New Jersey either spouse could seek reimbursement alimony in appropriate circumstances
since the alimony statute is gender neutral. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp.
1983-1984).
153 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 504, 453 A.2d at 535-36.
154 Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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459

science of the Mahoney court's recognition of reimbursement alimony
becomes clear. An equitable distribution award is permanent, since
there exists no statutory 5 7 or judicial 15 remedy to adjust the award.
On the other hand, alimony can generally be modified should the circumstances of the parties change. 5 Nevertheless, an important question in this regard is left unanswered by the Mahoney court's refusal
to "determine the degree of finality or permanency that should be accorded an award of reimbursement alimony as compared to conventional alimony." 60 The court left to future cases the decision "whether
and under what circumstances such awards may be modified or
adjusted."'' While the Mahoney decision can be faulted for sidestepping this important issue, it is significant that Justice Pashman left open
the possibility of revision of a reimbursement alimony award. 1 2 Since
flexibility is the hallmark of reimbursement alimony, future courts
awards to be modified
should preserve that principle and allow such
6 3
as the circumstances of the parties change.
While reimbursement alimony is used primarily to restore the more
tangible contributions of the supporting spouse such as household expenses and educational costs, arguably, the Mahoney decision does not
prevent compensation for less tangible contributions. The court, in dicta, recognized that when a wife provides support for her husband while
he pursues his education, she, in effect, experiences a lower standard
15'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
'ss See Erickson, supra note 29, at 981.
159 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23; see also Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse's
Education: Legal Protection For the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379
(1980). Professor Krauskopf, examining the relative merits of compensating a supporting spouse
through either an alimony award or through property distribution, concluded the alimony award
to be more advantageous since the full expectations of the parties can be considered. Id. at 416.
Thus, where a wife can show that she expected to share in the increased future earnings of her
husband she can obtain a portion of that value. If the requisite expectation is not proved then
the wife is only entitled to restitution for her outlays in financing her spouse's education. Id.
at 401. Conversely, a finding that a degree is property subject to distribution would create a
more rigid division in community property states where the value of such property is divided
equally. Id. at 415.
" Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 503 n.5, 453 A.2d at 535 n.5.
161Id.
162Id.
"' The Supreme Court of New Jersey should allow a modification when it appears, subsequent to the judgment, that the circumstances of the parties have greatly changed. For example,
where the supporting spouse enjoys a tremendous windfall such as winning a lottery or gaining
an inheritance and clearly does not even need restitutionary alimony the award can be modified
downward. Conversely, should the payor of reimbursement alimony suffer illness or severe financial
reverses which make it clear that he will be strained to fulfill the terms of the judgment then
also reimbursement alimony can be reduced. In addition, where an initial award is reduced because
of illness or financial strain to the educated spouse and that spouse regains his health or ability
to pay the award could be enlarged to the full amount compensable.
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of living than she would otherwise have known not only because of
her financial sacrifices but also because her husband has postponed his
own employment and financial contributions to the household in order
to pursue a new career. 1 4 Thus, to more fully restore the supporting
spouse, reimbursement alimony should in the future recognize this additional factor to some degree.
Another consideration of practical importance which may bode
well for the reimbursement approach is that under current federal law,
a property award can be discharged in bankruptcy while an alimony
award is not dischargeable.16 5 Since the federal bankruptcy courts are
not compelled to accept a state's characterization of an award as
dispositive, it remains to be seen whether a reimbursement alimony
award will be considered as alimony or as a property distribution under
federal law.' 6 The manner in which this question is resolved will bear
significantly upon other jurisdictions considering the relative merits of
creating an award based upon reimbursement alimony or fashioning
one through some other manner. If reimbursement alimony is subsequently held to be modifiable and not dischargeable in bankruptcy,
other jurisdictions will find it more equitable and protective of a spouse's
interest to base compensation to a supporting spouse on alimony rather
than on property distribution principles.
A determination that a spouse holds an interest based upon either
the value of the professional degree or the value of the degree holder's
future earnings would require a proper valuation of such an asset. Any
17
formula purporting to do so would be highly speculative and complex.
As the court in Mahoney observed, "[v]aluing a professional degree in
the hands of any particular individual at the start of his or her career
would involve a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than
guesswork." 68 On the other hand, a calculation for reimbursement purposes based upon the educational and support costs minus any contributions made by the supported spouse is relatively easy to formulate. 61
The argument has been advanced, however, that methods valuing future earning capacity can be formulated since calculations determining future earnings are utilized in worker's compensation, personal
injury, and wrongful death litigation. 170 Such an analysis apparently
164

Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500-01, 453 A.2d at 534.

165 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982).
166 Patrick & Meyer, An Overview of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1 BaNiK.

(1980).
167 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532.
168

Id.

166 Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534.
170

Weitzman, supra note 109, at 1219.

1, 32
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disregards two important factors. First, it ignores the differences between the perceived wrongs in a tort action and those in a failed marriage. "7Additionally, an entitlement to a spouse's future earnings would
deflate the status of a marriage to that of a business arrangement. 172 As
the Arizona Supreme Court noted in Wisner, prospective spouses have
the opportunity to formalize their respective duties and expectations in a
74
contract 73 provided the agreement does not contravene public policy.1
It has been argued that a mate who has supported a spouse in pursuit of an educational degree has in fact invested in human capital and
is entitled to a return of this investment. 75 Nevertheless, treatment of
an educational degree or license as property distributable upon divorce
often would create an oppressive obligation for the degree holder. 17
In effect, such a holding would give the supporting spouse a vested interest in an ex-spouse's future earnings despite the fact that contributions to the education were disproportionate in value to the earnings
anticipated over a lifetime. 7 The Mahoney court, by granting a reimbursement, created a restitutionary type of remedy without overcompensating the spouse who supported the household while the other
spouse attended school. 78 A decision recognizing a professional degree
as marital property would have the additional deleterious effect of stifling the incentive of the rewarded spouse to pursue his or her career
'

171 New Jersey has passed a no-fault divorce law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (d) (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984) (allows divorce where there is separation of 18 or more consecutive months
and where there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation). In contrast, a wrongful death action is premised upon the fact that an individual, through some fault of his own, caused the
death of another. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1952).
'7 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
Wisner, 129 Ariz. at 341, 631 P.2d at 123. The Wisner court refused to treat a marriage
as an "arm's length transaction" without the existence of a prenuptial agreement but noted that
"[i]f two individuals wish to define their marriage as such, they may of course do so and
memorialize it in a contract that spells out the specific rights and duties of each." Id.
"I' See, e.g., Lepis, 83 N.J. at 139, 416 A.2d at 45 (support agreement to be judicially enforced must be fair and equitable).
'7' See Krauskopf, supra note 159, at 379.
176 DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 58, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Ct. App. 1980).
177 Id. at 58-59, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
178 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (1973). Generally, restitution, or
"restoration" of the plaintiff's property or money, is awarded when the defendant has "gained
a benefit that it would be unjust for him to keep, though he gained it honestly." Id. at 224.
Arguably, it may be even more unfair for a person who has incurred numerous sacrifices, emotional as well as financial, in advancing a marital partner's education to be denied a share in
expected future benefits based upon the investment. Nevertheless, the concept of reimbursement
alimony effectively serves to compensate the supporting spouse not only for the amount contributed
to a partner's educational expenses, but also for the value of the living expenses provided.
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ambitions, thus thwarting the public policy of maintaining indepen179
dent and self-fulfilled citizens.
Despite the basic fairness of the result in Mahoney, the decision
is bound to be criticized in some quarters for not going far enough in
protecting a spouse who supported his or her marriage partner in the
attainment of an advanced degree. This criticism may develop because
the Mahoney court did not recognize reimbursement alimony as a matter of right. 180 The court, instead, specifically foreclosed the use of reimbursement alimony for an individual who financially supported his
spouse in the pursuit of an advanced degree when there is no expectation of future benefits by the supporting spouse. 181
While this latter result may seem inequitable since an expenditure
of resources has nonetheless been made, this situation is more accurately
characterized as either a fundamental outgrowth of the marital relationship or as a gift.18 2 Any decision allowing reimbursement without
the requisite expectation of future benefits would render the marital
union more akin to a business relationship, a result which the court
sought to prevent. 18 3 As long as the court does not require an unreasonable amount of proof to demonstrate the requisite expectation
and as long as traditional alimony and equitable distribution avenues
84
remain open, there is little danger that an unjust hardship will result. 1
Moreover, the Mahoney approach is superior when compared to
those of other jurisdictions. While at first glance the Horstmann view
may be more appealing in that it appears to provide a supporting spouse
Through the use of rehabilitative alimony the courts have made it clear that a beneficial
public policy is effectuated when a spouse is given the means to continue his or her education
and to become self-supporting. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
so Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 504, 453 A.2d at 536; see Erickson, supra note 29, at 972-73. Professor Erickson has suggested that the reimbursement be accomplished as a matter of right, without
regard to the expectation that future benefits will be derived, through the passage of a uniform
law that would give the supporting spouse a reimbursement for all of the educational and household
expenses that he or she has provided the spouse in school. Id. She contends that the uniform statute
is necessary because state courts and legislatures have failed to provide an equitable solution for
this situation. Id. at 948. Professor Erickson's proposed statute would be incorporated into the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (U.M.D.A.) and would reimburse the supporting spouse for
his/her contribution to the other spouse's school expenses including tuition, fees, books and other
supplies, living expenses, research, tutorial and clerical assistance, housework and maintenance
of the home and family in excess of the contributing spouse's equitable share plus other reasonable
expenses and contributions. Id. at 972-73. The statute also would provide for an offset if both
parties attended school in order to compensate the spouse who contributed the greater share and
also recognized that a spouse can waive his or her rights under the statute by signing a written
agreement. Id.
181 Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535.
1s
See Krauskopf, supra note 159, at 386, 394.
179

183See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
114 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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with a share in his or her mate's future earnings, it has not resolved
the problems of valuation and the potential for placing an oppressive
obligation upon the supported spouse. 8 5 The solution presented in
Graham is inadequate because it fails to address the specific situation
where traditional alimony and property distribution remedies are inapplicable, thus resulting in an injustice to the supporting spouse. 86
Likewise, the strict restitution approach utilized in Hubbard is not
always adequate l8 7 as pure restitution is a rigid concept more akin to
the settling of a debt. 88 Mahoney, on the other hand, allows the courts
to use a restitutionary-type remedy when appropriate but also provides
greater flexibility in that the principles of matrimonial law, such as
the right of modification, remain intact.
By allowing some measure of compensation for a spouse who has
sacrificed in order to provide broader educational opportunities for a
mate, the New Jersey Supreme Court has struck a reasonable "middle
ground" between affording no compensation and the finding of a property right. The Mahoney decision may thus serve as a sound model for
those jurisdictions that are facing the problem of characterizing a professional degree in order to properly compensate a divorcing spouse
who has worked to put his or her partner through school.
James V. Santulli

185

See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.

18 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
188See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 178, at 233, § 4.2.
117

